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Abstract
Using 20-year panel data, this paper tests Japanese companies’ sequential decisions:
(1) to invest abroad or not and (2) if so, what ownership strategy for that local com-
pany to be employed. In addition to transaction advantage emphasized by traditional
studies on FDI, the focus is the role of corporate governance of the parent companies
and institutional environment of the host countries. Through Heckman’s two-step esti-
mation, corporate governance is found to play an important role for entry decision but
not for ownership strategy. Transaction cost approach has been well supported for entry
decision. Most importantly, an institutional environment favorable to MNEs leads to
higher level of ownership of local companies. Firm size plays a signiﬁcant role for FDI
decision as well as for ownership decision.
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Two main questions on the geographical analysis of foreign direct investment (FDI) are
why a ﬁrm decides to be multinational and why diﬀering degrees of ownership are utilized
by multinational enterprises (MNEs). Several hypotheses have been suggested to address
the former question. The most popular approach is the transaction cost theory (Coase,
1937), indicated as “transaction advantage” throughout the paper, which investigates the
determinants of FDI and discusses the nature of the ﬁrm (Dunning, 1981; Markusen, 1995).
It argues that because of high transaction costs associated with the diﬃculties in selling
intangible assets, ﬁrms can only gain a return on these assets by producing the goods
themselves. In fact, this view has been central to much recent analyses of MNE’s role in
the economy (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Ethier, 1986; Barrel and Pain,
1999).
Once a ﬁrm has decided to enter a foreign market, it must make an ownership deci-
sion on which ownership to use for that market, where ownership is deﬁned as percent
equity holding taken when a foreign investment is made. Most early studies on ownership
strategies concentrate on transaction cost explanations such as Buckley and Casson (1976)
and Hennart (1982). Driven by transaction-related motives, a direct investment in a foreign
market means transferring of ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages to that market (Hymer, 1976). Hence,
higher ownership levels are interpreted as a response to the need to protect ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge from unwanted dissemination (Grossman and Hart, 1986). This argument is
legally supported by various researchers in their empirical examination of ownership strate-
gies (e.g., Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Cassers,
1989; Erramilli and Rao, 1993; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996).
Since the need to safeguard assets transferred to the foreign investment has been recog-
nized as an important determinant of ownership levels, recent works have begun extending
the transaction cost approach by including institutional variables of host country. Insti-
tutional variables include a broad array of host country characteristics such as political
and legal rules and social norms for business transactions which enhance our understand-
ing of ownership strategies (North, 1990). Aspects of the institutional environment can
have direct and indirect eﬀects on a foreign ﬁrm’s ownership strategy (Kogut and Singh,
21988). Several empirical studies (e.g., Beamish and Banks, 1987; Gomes-Casseres, 1989,
1990; Hennart, 1991; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Brouthers and
Brouthers, 2000; Makino and Neupert, 2000) explored the inﬂuence of local environment
on ownership strategies and found that foreign ownership level declined with the increased
need to source locally based host country assets.
The sharp increase of Japanese FDI over the last decade has provoked a substantial
amount of research into the determinants of Japanese FDI. There is now an extensive body
of literature suggesting that Japanese investment in industrial countries are explained by
similar factors, mainly ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages such as R&D and advertising intensities
(Kimura, 1989; Kogut and Chang, 1991; Drake and Caves, 1992; Hennart and Park, 1994;
Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996; Pugel, Kragas, and Kimura, 1996). However, a recent
study on ownership strategy of Japanese MNEs by Delios and Beamish (1999) ﬁnds that
when ﬁrm-level asset speciﬁcity was examined jointly with institutional variables, the ob-
served patterns in ownership levels in the subsidiaries of the nine East and South-East Asian
countries were not consistent with the predictions of transaction cost theory.
Using 20 year panel data of Japanese companies, this paper contributes to the literature
through the following three ways. First, the traditional approach discussed above consid-
ers separately entry decision and ownership strategy so that domestic companies which do
not join the investment abroad are ignored. Thus using Heckman’s (1979) two-step esti-
mation procedure, this paper simultaneously considers these two decisions and empirically
investigates the relative importance of the main approaches discussed above.
Second, this paper contributes to the growing debate surrounding transaction cost the-
ory (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Madhok, 1997) by testing the predictions of this theory in
a model with improved measures of transaction advantage and against competing explana-
tions regarding the importance of nontransactional factors such as corporate governance of
parent companies and institutional characteristics of host country that are less considered
in previous empirical studies. In estimation analysis, corporate governance is deﬁned as
ownership structure by foreign investors, ﬁnancial institutions and individual investors. As
Moschandreas (1994) indicated, the ownership structure of Japanese ﬁrms is characterized
by a relatively large equity share owned by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions.
3Third, it provides empirical estimation advantage by using ﬁrm-level data. Compared
to the studies referred above, this paper is expected to increase the robustness of estimation
results by extending the number of host countries, sample ﬁrms and sample periods.
Through Heckman two-step estimation, corporate governance is found to play an im-
portant role only for entry decision but not for ownership strategy. R&D which reﬂects
transaction advantage plays a signiﬁcant role for entry decision but not for ownership strat-
egy while advertising intensity is shown to be signiﬁcant for entry decision as well as for
ownership strategy. Another variable of transaction advantage, real GDP per capita of host
country, shows inverse relation with ownership level. The estimation results are in contrast
with the ﬁndings by Delios and Beamish (1999) for Japanese MNEs in East Asian countries.
Most importantly, the institutional environment plays a signiﬁcant and robust role in
ownership strategies, suggesting that an environment favorable to MNEs leads to higher
level of ownership of local companies. And age is shown to be signiﬁcant for entry decision
supporting an ecological perspective. Finally, Keiretsu is not shown to be signiﬁcant for
entry decision as well as ownership strategy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model structure and Section
3 describes data and determinants of entry decision and ownership strategy. After the
estimation results are discussed, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Speciﬁcation
2.1 Model Structure and Ownership Strategy
The model structure on the joint decision of entry decision and ownership strategy is simpli-
ﬁed in Figure 1. In stage 1, all companies in Japan are supposed to decide whether they will
invest abroad or not. This entry decision is mainly determined by transaction advantage
as well as the other characteristics of the parent companies such as corporate governance
and age. Thus unlike in previous studies, companies that are not investing abroad are also
considered in the estimation process.
In stage 2, companies that have decided to invest abroad choose the share of ownership
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Figure 1: Model Structure
transaction advantage over local competitors, their own corporate governance as well as
their preference for an investment environment, i.e., institutional environment.
Since entry decision in stage 1 has been developed well in the studies referred above,
ownership strategy in stage 2 is discussed in detail. In the beginning, corporate governance is
assumed to be constant to focus on the joint eﬀect of transaction advantage and institutional
environment.
Let us assume a simple nonlinear combination of institutional environment and trans-





where Θjt is the institutional environment of host country j at time t and Gijt is deﬁned as
transaction advantage between parent company i and company j in host country at time
5t.1 Here η>0 implies a nonlinear and positive relation between transaction advantages and
ownership levels. Figure 2 (with η =1 )shows how institutional environment and transaction
advantage play roles in ownership strategy and provides the following implications.
Remark 1 (Institutional Environment) Suppose that parent company i decides to in-
vest to two countries 1 and 2, and assume that two host countries have the same transaction
advantage, G0, but diﬀerent levels of institutional environment, Θ1 > Θ2. Then we can eas-
ily show that parent company i will prefer higher ownership for country 1 under the same
transaction advantage, owni1 >o w n i2.
Remark 2 (Transaction Advantage) Suppose that two host countries, 1 and 2, have the
same institutional environment, Θ1 = Θ2. The ownership levels chosen by parent company
i will be ranked solely by transaction advantage, supporting transaction cost hypothesis.
Remark 3 (Transaction Advantage and Institution) Assume that transaction ad-
vantage with country 1 is lower than that with country 2, i.e., Gi1 <G i2A or Gi1 <G i2B.
Since institutional environment of country 1 is better than that of country 2, Θ1 > Θ2,
ownership will be Owni2A or Owni2B, depending on transaction advantage.
2.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The determinants of entry decision and ownership strategy can be eﬀectively examined by
jointly investigating the factors discussed above such as transaction advantage, institution,
and corporate governance.
First, in order to identify the determinants of FDI decision, the following stochastic
model of the latent variable is used.
FDIit = αXit + uit, (2)
where FDIit is a latent variable of FDI of ﬁrm i at time t w h i c hi so b s e r v e do n l yw h e n
positive. The matrix, X, includes various ﬁrm characteristics. The last term, u,r e p r e s e n t s
the well-behaved stochastic error term. Notice that FDIit is independent of host country
1For a brevity, the same symbol, j,is used for the host country and company.
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Figure 2: Transaction Advantage and Institutional Environment
j. Thus equation (2) assumes that the entry decision by individual ﬁrm is conducted by its
own characteristics because all ﬁrms face identical institutional environment in the world.
Then the entry decision function is deﬁned by the following binary response model
assuming probit structure:
d_FDIit =1 [αXit + uit > 0],( 3 )
where 1[ ] is an indicator function.
From equation (3), P[d_FDIit|Xit]=Φ(αXit) where Φ() is the standard cumulative
normal density.
Next, a ﬁrm’s strategic decision on which ownership to use in accordance to its entry to
a foreign market is estimated by using the following:
Ownijt = β0Gijt + β1Xit + β2Yjt + εijt if d_FDIit =1 , (4)
where Ownijt is the ownership share of ﬁrm i to a subsidiary in country j at time t. Xit
is the same as in equation (2) and Yjt is included as another set of independent variables
7in order to consider the eﬀects of host country characteristics which are independent of the
parent company. Note that all MNEs investing to the same host countries face identical
host country characteristics. εij is a well-behaved stochastic error term.2
Least squares regression using the observed data produces inconsistent estimates of
parameters (β0,β 1,β 2) (Heckman, 1979). In order to get consistent estimation of the pa-
rameters, we follow Heckman’s two-step estimation which considers the presence of selection
bias as an omitted variable problem in the selected sample. The equation to examine is the
one for ownership, conditioned on the event of a FDI decision of equation (2). Following
equations (3) and (4),
d_FDIit =1 [ αXit + uit > 0],( 5 )
Ownijt = αGijt + β1Xit + β2Yjt + εijt if d_FDIit =1 , (6)
where a) ui and εij are independent of explanatory variables with zero mean, b) ui˜N(0,1),
and c) E[εij|ui]=ρui.3
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
The sample of Japanese foreign subsidiaries is drawn from the 2001 Kaigai Shinshutsu
Kigyou (Overseas Japanese Companies Data). Toyo Keizai compiles this data as a part of an
annual survey of the overseas operations of major listed and non-listed Japanese companies.
The survey data are supplemented by referring to annual reports, newspaper accounts and
other media. Our initial sample totaled 13,779 subsidiaries.4 Because parent company data
2Since Ownijt is deﬁned only between 0 and 1, equation (4) can estimated by a Tobit model. Since the
estimation results are compared with those of a sample selection model by Heckman, the paper uses a liner
regression to ignore a common bias of the estimated coeﬃcients from both estimation techniques. Then we
can isolate the eﬀect of the sample selection bias by ignoring bias by a linear regression.
3The assumption E[εij|ui]=ρui requires linearity in the population regression of εij on ui.I t a l w a y s
holds if (εij,u i) is bivariate normal but holds under weaker assumptions. In particular, we do not need to
assume that εij itself is normally distributed (Wooldridge, 2002, p.562).
4The 4,441 subsidiaries which belong to the same parent compaines are excluded.
8Table 1: Ownership Strategy by Years and Industries (Full Sample)
Manufacturing Non-manufacturing Total
Average Ownership
1980-1984 62.3(536) 70.7(653) 66.9(1,189)
1985-1989 62.6(1,364) 71.5(1,854) 67.8(3,218)
1990-1994 62.2(1,635) 65.4(1,635) 64.1(4,113)
1995-1999 60.8(2,227) 66.4(3,032) 64.0(5,259)
Total 61.8(5,762) 67.6(8,017) 65.2(13,779)
Note: The numbers of foreign aﬃliates are in parentheses.
were required for our analysis, we matched the identical parent company for each subsidiary
to the companies obtained from the Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS)
collected by Nikkei Zaimu of Nihon Keizai Shinbun (2002). The establishment year data
are sourced from the Japan Company Handbook, documented annually by Toyo Keizai.
GDP per capita is from World Development Indicators (2002).
3.2 Trends of Ownership Strategy
Table 1 shows the average ownership across years and industries. Over 1980-1999, the av-
erage ownership of Japanese companies in 13,779 foreign aﬃliates was 65.2 percent. By
industry, non-manufacturing industries held relatively higher ownership (67.6 percent) rel-
ative to that of manufacturing sector (61.8 percent). There is no signiﬁcant change in this
trend over years except a slight drop in the non-manufacturing sector.
3.3 Determinants of Entry Decision and Ownership Strategy
The main determinants for entry decision and ownership strategy are classiﬁed into three
groups. The ﬁr s to n ei sc o r p o r a t eg o v e r n a n c ew h i c hi sr e ﬂected by the ownership structure
of parent companies. It is assumed that corporate governance plays a signiﬁcant role in
deciding entry decision and ownership strategy. The second one is transaction advantage
between the parent and host companies. The third group is the institutional environment
of host countries which aﬀects ownership strategy but not entry decision.
93.3.1 Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is deﬁned by the ownership structure of parent company. Ownership
by shareholders is the right to possess something and to decide what is to be done with it.
A shareholder who owns a majority of a company’s voting shares has a controlling interest.
His/her vote decides who, apart from himself/herself or his/her representative, is appointed
to the board of directors and so determines the policy of the business. This applies also
when a few shareholders together own the majority. What remains in question then is how
diﬀerent ownership structures held by diﬀerent economic agents aﬀect FDI decision and
ownership strategies.
Table 2 shows the recent trends of the ownership structures of manufacturing (Manu)
and non-manufacturing (Non) industries since 1973, the ﬁrst year of the availability of
foreign ownership variable. The data includes six economic agents as shareholders: govern-
ment/public institutions, ﬁnancial institutions, security companies, foreigners, other cor-
porations and individual investors. This paper categorizes them into ﬁve: government,
foreigners, individuals, ﬁnancial institutions (ﬁnancial institutions and security companies)
and other corporations.
The ownership structure of each category has shown diﬀerent trends over the period.
It is shown that the government ownership, although with many missing data, was higher
in non-manufacturing sectors but the gap with other categories has narrowed since 1990s.
Strikingly, foreign ownership has ﬂuctuated since 1973 even though the absolute share is not
high. For example, it has been stable until 1979 but has increased until 1985, decreased since
then and increased again in 1989.5 The ownership of ﬁnancial institutions and other corpo-
rations tends to increase over time while that of individual investors indicates a decreasing
trend between 1973 and 1991 and then stays stable until 1997. Since 1990, however, the
gap among three agents, individuals, ﬁnancial institutions and other corporations, becomes
lower.
5By sectors, as classiﬁed by Nikkei, the foreign ownership held by most of industries was less than 10
percent except for telecommunication (10.7 percent) in nonmanufacturing sector and pharmaceuticals (12.2
percent) and petroleum products (11.9 percent) in manufacturing sector. The data is available from the
author on request.
10Table 2: Recent Trends of Ownership Structure(percent)
Government Foreigner Individual Finance Corporation
Manu Non Manu Non Manu Non Manu Non Manu Non
1973 0.3 3.6 3.2 1.7 43.8 47.1 24.4 22.0 29.5 30.6
1975 0.2 2.0 2.7 1.2 43.0 46.3 24.4 22.0 30.9 31.1
1980 0.2 3.6 3.3 1.4 40.4 44.6 26.8 24.3 30.7 30.8
1985 0.2 3.1 5.8 3.6 34.4 40.2 28.5 24.6 31.3 32.4
1990 1.0 3.2 3.8 3.2 29.0 32.9 33.5 29.0 32.8 34.8
1995 0.2 0.6 5.5 4.9 30.0 33.0 32.2 28.1 31.4 33.8
1999 0.2 0.5 5.3 4.9 33.4 34.5 29.7 26.7 30.6 32.9
Total 0.2 1.6 4.5 3.7 34.9 37.7 29.3 26.2 31.3 32.9
Note: Manu and Non represent manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries,
respectively.
3.3.2 Transaction Advantage
Many empirical literature discussed above deﬁnes transaction advantage as intangible assets
held by the parent companies. However, as in Figure 1, this does not reﬂect real transaction
advantage between the parent companies and the local companies since the level of transac-
tion advantage of the local competitors varies across host countries and/or companies. Thus
to reﬂect true transaction advantage of the parent companies, it is necessary to control for
the level of transaction advantage of the local competitors. In this paper, the transaction
advantage of the parent company is approximated by intangible assets held by them and
that of the local competitors is by the real GDP per capita of host countries.
1. Intangible assets
R&D intensity (knowledge) and advertising (goodwill) intensity are extensively used as
representatives of intangible assets. Helpman (1984) predicts that ﬁrms with intangible
assets would be more likely to invest abroad in order to minimize transaction costs and
exploit their intangible assets overseas as well as at home.
As suggested by transaction cost theory, a greater degree of proprietary content in mar-
keting and technological assets leads to higher ownership levels in the foreign operation
because MNEs prefer internal channels over contracts when transferring technological ca-
pabilities. A ﬁrm with high R&D intensity may prefer to have complete control over its
proprietary know-how in order to preserve and/or best exploit the know-how, given im-
11perfections in the external markets for technology (e.g., Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves,
1982). Thus, the higher the R&D intensity, the greater the possibility that the foreign
aﬃliate will be fully-owned (Stopford and Wells, 1972; Davidson, 1982).
2. GDP per capita
When we consider ownership strategy across countries, the level of intangible assets held
by the parent companies is not enough to calculate transaction advantage between the parent
company and the local competitors of the host country. Therefore as an approximation of
transaction advantage held by local competitors, per capita GDP is used. This variable
can be interpreted as the level of labor productivity, representing the level of transaction
advantage of the host countries.
3.3.3 Institutional Environment
In addition to transaction advantage variables, the institutional environment has been shown
to aﬀect the ownership strategies. As an institutional environment variable, Economic
Freedom Indices, constructed by The Fraser Institute, are used. The summary index is
based on 23 components designed to identify the consistency of institutional arrangements
and policies with economic freedom in seven major areas and the data are released by 1 to 10
scale in every ﬁve years from 1970 to 1995 and every year afterward.6 T h ec o r ei n g r e d i e n t s
are personal choice, legal protection of property rights, freedom of exchange, reliance on
markets, use of money, and market allocation of capital. Individuals have economic freedom
when: (a) their property acquired without the use of force, fraud, or theft is protected from
physical invasions by others and (b) they are not forced to use, exchange, or give their
property to another as long as their actions do not violate the identical rights of others.7
6The missing data of other years are generated by linearly interpolate method.
7Instead, it is likely that what matters most to MNEs is the extent to which future policies, e.g., taxation
and regulation, can be forecast and how sensitive these policies are the changes in the current political
environment. Recent works by Delios and Henisz (2000) and Henisz and Zelner (2001) begin to rectify
these problems by employing a more objective measure of policy change and comparing its eﬀectiveness in
predicting market entry modes.
12Table 3: Main Variables
Variable Variable Deﬁnition
Corporate governance Foreign ownership of foreign investors
Individual ownership of individual investors
Finance ownership of ﬁnancial institutions
Transaction advantage R&D R&D expenditures/sales
Advertising advertising expenditures/sales
GDP real gdp per capita
Institutional environment Institution Economic freedom index
Other variables Export export/sales
Firm size sales
Age age of parent company
Keiretsu large bank-centered groups
3.3.4 Other Variables
In addition to the variables mentioned above, other control variables are considered. They
are investing ﬁrm’s size, age and membership to Keiretsu, and the ratio of export to GDP.
1 .T h es i z eo ft h ep a r e n tc o m p a n y
Greater size allows companies to engage in more extensive international activities be-
cause it is reasoned that they are more likely to possess the necessary ﬁnancial resources
for foreign operations. The size of the parent company is measured by the number of total
employees at the time (year) of foreign entry which is sourced from NEEDS (2002).
2. Age
Setting up a ﬁrst plant in a foreign country is a major strategic decision for most
ﬁrms because it represents a departure from the organization’s traditional practices and is
surrounded by unusual uncertainty, thus requiring ﬁrms to search for information and legit-
imacy. Age is a potentially important variable aﬀecting new market entry. Organizational
ecologists have long argued that a ﬁrm’s likelihood of engaging in strategic change depends
on its age. The key concept in their reasoning is structural inertia. The older the ﬁrm, the
less likely it is to engage in change or adaptation because the proliferation of rules, routines,
and internal organizational arrangements over time reinforces the organization’s adopted
13course of action (Haveman, 1993; Ranger-Moore, 1997).
3. Exports
Conventional neoclassical models of the MNEs view exports and FDI as substitutes,
particularly in the manufacturing sector. In addition, if FDI is directed to industries in
which Japan has comparative advantages, then imports and FDI are likely to be positively
related.8 In particular, new products require speciﬁc skills and knowledge so that eﬀective
maintenance and support can be provided. The parent company may also ﬁnd quality
supervision more eﬀective if it directly controls the network. Hence, whether exports and
FDI are substitutes or complements needs to be resolved empirically. This variable is
measured by the ratio of exports to sales.
4. Keiretsu
In addition to ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets, there are indications that there is a role to play for
interﬁrm linkages within Japanese business group, Keiretsu. For instance, Hoshi, Kashyap,
and Scharfstein (1992) found that ﬁrms that are members of one of the six bank-centered
(horizontal) keiretsu are signiﬁcantly less liquidity constrained in their investment decisions
than non-member ﬁrms.9 This could imply that membership of horizontal business groups
also helps to facilitate ﬁnancing of risky foreign ventures. This paper uses the six bank-
centered keiretsu which are sourced from Kigyo Keiretsu Souran 1997 (Toyo Keizai).
The variables listed above and used in the estimation are summarized in Table 3 and
the matrix of correlation coeﬃcients of the variables is reported in the Appendix.
8Graham and Krugmen (1993) argue that, for some industries, foreign investment is likely to be com-
plementary with trade. Baldwin (1990) suggests that downstream services are typically associated with the
level of export sales from the parent country to the host country. Some of these facilities can be set up by
locals, although parent country involvement may be beneﬁcial.
9In addition to Keiretsu, other variables used in the paper, ﬁrm size and ownership of ﬁnancial institution,
reﬂect the ﬁnancial environment of parent companies for operations of foreign subsidiaries. For exmple, as
the ﬁrm size or share of ﬁnancial institutions is larger, a ﬁr mh a sm o r ei n c e n t i v e st oi n v e s ta b r o a db e c a u s e
it has more ﬁnancial resources.
14Table 4: Baseline Model: Entry Decision and Ownership Strategy
Decision Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.233 -0.151 0.119 0.151
(-3.45)** (-1.94) (1.79) (1.74)
Advertising 2.839 2.984 -7.051 -7.935
(2.48)** (1.98) (-4.16)** (-4.11)**
Firm size 0.634 0.610 -0.116 -0.111
(39.78)** (31.60)** (-9.00)** (-5.94)**
Keiretsu 0.055 0.061 -0.104 -0.185
(1.01) (0.94) (-1.71) (-2.41)*
R&D 6.350 -2.515
(4.78)** (-1.79)
Constant -8.023 -8.040 4.877 4.549
(-26.80)** (-22.56)** (15.58)** (11.03)**
year dummies included included included included
industry dummies included included included included
Observations 37,645 21,401 7,882 5,421
R-squared 0.42 0.36 0.05 0.06
Note: 1) Robust z statistics in parentheses.
2) * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
4 Estimation Results
This section tests the determinants of entry decision and ownership strategies by MNEs.
First of all, the baseline model speciﬁcation as a traditional approach is tested. Thus
this model speciﬁcation does not include the variables such as corporate governance and
institutional environments. Next, after the determinants of two decisions are separately
estimated by using probit and a linear regression estimation techniques, they are jointly
estimated by a sample selection model by Heckman (1979).
4.1 Baseline Model Speciﬁcation
This subsection tests the role of transaction advantage and other control variables which
have been used in the traditional approach on the determinants of FDI and ownership
strategy. Unlike the studies on FDI decision which use only companies which have invested
abroad, we include all domestic and multinational companies. Table 4 reports the estimation
15results for entry decision (Decision) by probit analysis and ownership strategy (Ownership)
by a linear regression analysis, respectively.
As we expected, age is negatively related to entry decision so that the older the ﬁrm, the
less likely it is to engage in change, i.e., investment abroad. But it is positively related to
ownership level, showing that elder ﬁrms prefer higher ownership level. Thus the ecological
view for FDI decision has been supported.
The results for the variables which reﬂect transaction advantage are interesting. Ad-
vertising and R&D intensity are positively related to FDI entry decision but negatively
related to ownership strategy. Thus the transaction cost explanation for entry decision has
been strongly supported while its explanation for ownership strategy becomes reversed. In
addition, ﬁrm size plays a positive role for entry decision but a negative role for ownership
levels. Finally, Keiretsu is not related to entry decision and ownership levels. The following
subsection tests the robustness of these estimation results.
4.2 Entry Decision
The probit estimation results for entry decision of all companies are reported in Table 5. As
the baseline model shows, age is negatively related to entry decision, supporting an ecological
view. Two main variables which reﬂect intangible assets, advertising intensity and R&D
intensity, show robust and signiﬁcant estimation results, showing positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients after industry dummies are controlled for. First, the advertising intensity is not
consistently signiﬁcant. This variable plays a positive role for Speciﬁcations (4), (5), and
(6) after industry dummies are included while it is not signiﬁcant for Speciﬁcations (1), (2)
and (3) without industry dummies. However, another variable, R&D intensity, is shown to
be positive and signiﬁcant for all model speciﬁcations.
In addition, Table 5 includes the ownership structure of parent companies which reﬂect
corporate governance. The all shareholders, foreign and individual investors and ﬁnan-
cial institutions, tend to increase the incentive to invest abroad. As one of other control
variables, the size of parent companies tends to show a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient,
implying that the size of parent company is positively related with the incentive to invest
abroad. The ratio of exports to sales shows a positive coeﬃcient and thus the conventional
16Table 5: Entry Decision
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
Foreign 1.983 1.832 1.080 1.402 1.439 1.241
(5.27)** (3.95)** (2.45)* (4.41)** (3.78)** (3.10)**
Individual -0.110 -0.187 0.151 0.470 0.532 0.442
(-0.47) (-0.67) (0.57) (2.33)* (2.21)* (1.76)
Finance 1.521 1.250 1.050 1.327 1.235 1.086
(6.38)** (4.46)** (3.76)** (6.35)** (4.95)** (4.09)**
Age -0.074 -0.175 -0.201 -0.323 -0.227 -0.170
(-0.99) (-1.82) (-2.12)* (-4.61)** (-2.71)** (-1.85)
Advertising -0.784 0.178 1.440 2.647 2.975 2.349
(-0.75) (0.17) (-0.05) (2.25)* (2.01)* (1.76)
Firm size 0.451 0.424 0.473 0.582 0.561 0.528
(20.92)** (16.09)** (20.83)** (29.83)** (24.39)** (22.01)**
Keiretsu -0.102 -0.034 -0.019 0.068 0.078 0.066
(-1.73) (-0.48) (-0.27) (1.29) (1.22) (0.94)
R&D 5.406 2.270 5.018 3.705
(4.74)** (2.32)* (3.84)** (2.90)**
Exports 1.689 0.721
(10.22)** (5.12)**
Constant -6.372 -5.690 -6.277 -7.654 -7.737 -7.263
(-18.78)** (-13.53)** (-15.02)** (-22.28)** (-18.59)** (-15.79)**
year dummies included included included included included included
industry dummies included included included
observations 33,500 19,945 15,743 33,500 19,928 15,743
R-squared 0.34 0.29 0.32 0.41 0.36 0.34
Note: 1) Robust z statistics are in parentheses. 2) * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
17Table 6: Ownership Strategy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign -2.153 -2.315 -1.495 -2.093
(-5.77)** (-4.52)** (-3.86)** (-4.08)**
Individual 0.612 0.622 0.893 0.852
(2.33)* (1.91) (3.31)** (2.56)*
Finance -1.623 -1.644 -1.716 -1.952
(-6.62)** (-5.64)** (-6.67)** (-6.28)**
Age 0.544 0.604 0.634 0.620
(10.06)** (8.89)** (10.27)** (7.63)**
Advertising -4.183 -4.573 -4.488 -5.857
(-2.49)* (-2.34)* (-2.43)** (-2.79)**
Firm size 0.039 0.032 0.021 0.037
(3.31)** (1.99) (1.29) (1.71)
Institution 0.300 0.306 0.283 0.289
(10.45)** (8.47)** (9.87)** (8.01)**
GDP/100 -0.332 -0.346 -0.315 -0.325
(-11.47)** (-9.61)** (-10.95)** (-9.09)**
Keiretsu 0.087 -0.450 -0.092 -0.198
(1.37) (-0.61) (-1.42) (-2.43)*
R&D -2.801 -2.243
(-2.56)* (-1.57)
year dummies included included included Included
industry dummies included included
observations 7,223 5,003 7,223 5,003
R-squared 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.78
Note: 1) Robust z statistics are in parentheses.
2) * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
view on the trade-oﬀ relation between FDI and exports is not supported empirically.10
Another control variable, Keiretsu, is not shown to be signiﬁcant.
4.3 Ownership Strategy
The ownership strategy by MNEs is tested through a linear regression estimation. Estima-
tion results are reported in Table 6.
10In order to consider the possibility that exports and entry decision are jointly determined, speciﬁcations
(2) vrsus (3) and (5) versus (6) with and without exports are separately estimated and compared. The
estimation results are quite consistent.
18First, unlike the estimation results for entry decision in Table 5, after other control
variables are added to the baseline model speciﬁcation, age plays a signiﬁcant and positive
role for ownership strategy. Furthermore the transaction advantage variables, advertising
intensity and R&D intensity, show negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, which are quite
inconsistent with the ﬁndings of Delios and Beamish (1999) for East and South-East Asian
countries.
The income per capita of host countries is shown to be negative and signiﬁcant. Higher
income per capita of the host country means that technology gap with the home country
is narrowed so that given institutional environment, MNEs prefer lower level of ownership.
Thus these ﬁndings support ownership strategy by transaction advantage.
The shareholders of the parent companies play an important role as well. Foreign
investors and ﬁnancial institutions are relatively reluctant to hold more shares of local
companies while individual investors do show a signiﬁcant tendency to hold more ownership.
The estimation results are inconsistent with those for entry decision as well. The size of
the parent companies shows a positive coeﬃcient, which implies that the larger the parent
companies, the higher the ownership they want to hold. The estimation results for the ﬁrm
size in Tables 5 and 6 imply that larger companies tend to invest abroad and to hold higher
ownership levels of local companies.
Another important control variable, institution, shows a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient, implying that the host countries favorable to MNEs tend to make them hold higher
share of local companies which is quite consistent with theoretical background discussed in
the ﬁrst section. Interestingly, Keiretsu is not shown to be signiﬁcant. Finally, the explana-
tory power of the extended model becomes much higher than that of the baseline model by
increasing from around 0.05 to 0.78.
In general, the hypothesis discussed in Section 2 that ownership strategy is aﬀected by
the combination of transaction advantage and institutional environment is well supported.
Furthermore, corporate governance is shown to play a signiﬁcant role.
194.4 A Heckman’s Sample Selection Model
As discussed in the introduction, the empirical analysis to investigate determinants of over-
seas entry decision as well as ownership strategy does not consider the behaviors of other
domestic companies which do not join investment abroad and thus the estimation might be
subject to a sample selection bias. Thus two step are followed: estimation for the determi-
nants of FDI entry decision by considering all companies (domestic and MNEs) and then
estimation of the determinants of ownership strategy of all MNEs.
Table 7 reports the estimation results by following a Heckman’s sample selection model.11
In order to consider the eﬀect of a change in sample size, the probit estimation results for
entry decision are reported as well. Since they are quite consistent with those of Table 5,
this subsection discusses the estimation results only for ownership strategy. Table 8 reports
the estimation results of a sample selection model by manufacturing and non-manufacturing
sectors, respectively. Speciﬁcations (4) and (5) in Table 5 are used as selection equations,
respectively. The exclusion variables for the selection equations are industry and location
dummies of parent companies for Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) and export ratio to sales of
parent companies in addition to two variables used in the previous speciﬁc a t i o n si sf o r
Speciﬁcation (3).
First, the selection bias is critical since the hypothesis that the coeﬃcient for the inverse
of the Mill’s ratio (Mills lamda) is equal to zero is rejected for all estimation speciﬁcations.
Second, the coeﬃcient for manufacturing dummy is not shown to signiﬁcant, which reﬂects
that the relatively higher ownership level of non-namufacturing sectors in Table 1 is not
statistically signiﬁcant after other variables are controlled for.
Third, unlike the results in Tables 4 and 6, the signiﬁcant role of age disappeared so
that an organizational ecology perspective has not been supported under consideration of
a sample selection bias.
Fourth, the variables which reﬂect transaction advantage are interesting. Transaction
advantage variables, advertising intensity and GDP per capita, are shown to be signiﬁcant
for ownership strategy which is consistent with the estimation results in Table 6. However,
R&D intensity became less signiﬁcant than that without considering a sample selection
11The separate estimation results for manufacturing and nonfacturing sectors are reported in Table 8.
20bias of Table 6. However, if we estimate the same model by manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors, the coeﬃcients for advertising is shown to be negative and signiﬁcant
for manufacturing sector while R&D intensity is shown to be negative and signiﬁcant only
for non-manufacturing sector (Table 8). Real income per capita is shown to be negative and
signiﬁcant over all estimation speciﬁcations even though the absolute value of the coeﬃcient
becomes smaller. Thus if we assume that it reﬂects the level of productivity of the host
country, it can be interpreted that transaction advantage is inversely related with ownership
strategy after other variables are controlled for. From these ﬁndings, we cannot reject the
role of transaction cost approach.
Fifth, the results on the ownership structure of the parent company are shown to be
diﬀerent from the results by estimation without consideration of a sample selection bias
in Table 6. If we consider a sample selection bias, while foreign investors show the same
estimation results, individual investors and ﬁnancial institutions do show diﬀerent results.
Individual investors tend to hold lower ownership levels under considering a sample selection
bias while they tended to hold higher ownership levels without considering a sample selection
bias. In addition, ﬁnancial institutions do not show a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient if a sample
selection bias is considered which is in contrast with the results of Table 6. In addition, the
absolute coeﬃcient for foreign investors becomes smaller. The estimation results for foreign
investors are clariﬁed by the estimation by sectors. As Table 8 shows, the coeﬃcient for
foreign investors is higher for non-manufacturing sector.
Sixth, as in all other estimation results, institution variable is positive and signiﬁcant for
ownership strategy even though the value of the coeﬃcient decreases under consideration of
a sample selection bias. Furthermore, it is shown that the institution variable is quite robust
over all estimation techniques and model speciﬁcations. In addition, the size of the parent
company plays a positive and signiﬁcant role for ownership decision over all estimations.
T h er o l eo fﬁrm size is strengthened under consideration of a sample selection bias showing
that the coeﬃcient rises from about 0.03 in Table 6 to 0.20 in Table 7.
215C o n c l u s i o n
Using 20-year panel data, this paper tests Japanese companies’ sequential decisions: (1) to
invest abroad or not and (2) if they decide to invest abroad, what ownership strategy for
that local company to be employed.
Through Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure, corporate governance plays an im-
portant role for entry decision but not for ownership strategy decision. Foreign investors
and ﬁnancial institutions tend to invest abroad while individual investors do not. However,
they do not aﬀect the ownership strategy in the host countries. Financial institutions are
shown to prefer lower ownership levels without considering a sample selection bias but their
role disappear otherwise.
Second, transaction cost approach is well supported for entry decision but for ownership
decision. Advertising and R&D intensities show positive relation with the decision to invest
abroad. For ownership strategy, advertising intensity is inversely related with ownership
levels while R&D intensity is not shown to be signiﬁcant. In addition, real GDP per capita
as an approximation of productivity level of host country is shown to be negative and
signiﬁcant for ownership strategy.
Third, most importantly, the institutional environment favorable to MNEs leads to
higher level of ownership of local companies. Fourth, ﬁrm size plays a positive and signiﬁcant
role for entry decision as well as ownership strategy. Fifth, ﬁrm age plays a signiﬁcant role
for entry decision, supporting an organizational ecology perspective. Finally, Keiretsu is
not shown to be signiﬁcant for entry decision as well as ownership strategy.
In conclusion, under consideration of a sample selection bias, institutional environment is
shown to be more important than transaction variables for ownership strategy. In addition,
as a part of transaction variables, per capita GDP of the host countries is an important
determinant of ownership strategy. Thus the hypothesis that entry choice and ownership
strategy are determined by a combination of transaction cost approach and institutional
environment is well supported. And once the corporate governance of the parent company
which is shown to be signiﬁcant for entry decision is controlled for, we ﬁnd that ﬁrm age
becomes less important in explaining entry decision as well as ownership strategy.
22Table 7: A Sample Selection Model
(1) (2) (3)
decision ownership decision ownership decision ownership
Foreign 1.680 -1.563 1.804 -1.909 1.285 -1.933
(10.30)** (-4.91)** (8.80)** (-4.21)** (5.78)** (-4.13)**
Individual 0.290 -0.819 0.348 -0.447 0.400 -0.432
(2.47)* (-3.24)** (2.35)* (-1.35) (2.45)** (-1.24)
Finance 1.309 -0.360 1.300 -0.491 1.176 -0.378
(11.99)** (-1.54) (9.61)** (-1.61) (7.93)** (-1.18)
Age -0.337 0.061 -0.257 0.776 -0.229 0.106
(-9.89)** (0.98) (-5.96)** (0.90) (-4.52)** (1.15)
Advertising 3.304 -5.587 3.859 -5.948 2.195 -5.938
(5.42)** (-4.09)** (5.45)** (-3.59)** (2.39)** (-3.10)**
Firm size 0.552 0.183 0.519 0.230 0.535 0.255
(59.81)** (7.74)** (43.61)** (6.96)** (38.70)** (7.32)**
Institution 0.194 0.205 0.204
(7.85)** (6.18)** (5.99)**
GDP/100 -0.279 -0.287 -0.297
(-11.53)** (-8.95)** (-9.01)**
Keiretsu 0.580 0.029 0.039 -0.066 0.056 0.002
(2.10)* (0.55) (1.12) (-0.92) (1.44) (0.03)
R&D 5.466 -0.342 3.692 -0.147
(7.26)** (-0.32) (4.63)** (-0.13)
Exports 1.048
(8.93)**
=1 if manufacturing 0.001 0.149 0.115
(0.03) (1.71) (1.21)
Constant -7.966 0.410 -7.982 -0.542 -6.218 -1.156
(-33.43)** (0.88) (-27.95)** (-0.85) (-11.10)** (-1.74)
year dummies included included included included included included
industry dummies included included included
Prefecture dummies included included included
Mills lamda 0.796 0.908 1.091
(10.46)** (8.69)** (9.73)**
rho 0.458 0.492 0.579
sigma 1.738 1.846 1.884
observations 32,862 19,549 15,377
Note: 1) Robust z statistics are in parentheses. 2) * signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%.
3) Mills lamda is rho multiplied by sigma.
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28Table A1: The Correlation Matrix
Foreign Individual Finance Age Advertising Firm size
Foreign 1.0000
Individual -0.3080 1.0000
Finance 0.1021 -0.3211 1.0000
Age 0.0468 -0.1398 0.3120 1.0000
Advertising 0.0314 0.1063 -0.0320 -0.0327 1.0000
Firm size 0.2476 -0.3299 0.5121 0.1421 -0.1702 1.0000
Institution -0.0195 0.0098 -0.0155 -0.0169 0.0132 -0.0753
GDP -0.0401 0.0404 0.0088 -0.0731 0.0791 -0.1028
Keiretsu -0.1068 0.0534 0.1174 0.0966 -0.3306 0.1563
R&D 0.2339 -0.0403 0.1070 0.1668 0.2393 -0.0452
Exports 0.1794 -0.0408 -0.0133 -0.1506 0.0771 -0.0198









Keiretsu -0.0202 -0.0314 1.0000
R&D 0.0656 0.0851 -0.0760 1.0000
Exports 0.0046 0.0646 -0.0178 0.1715 1.0000
29Table A2: Descriptive Statistics
80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99
Foreign 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.061
(7,269) (9,693) (11,734) (13,621)
Individual 0.319 0.273 0.247 0.250
(9,680) (11,380) (12,966) (14,054)
Finance 0.241 0.279 0.297 0.282
(8,785) (10,392) (12,081) (13,742)
Age 3.656 3.744 3.826 3.932
(8,727) (10,956) (11,686) (12,712)
Advertising 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009
(9,382) (10,903) (12,332) (12,967)
Firm size 10.489 10.852 11.204 11.435
(10,499) (12,123) (13,453) (14,189)
Institution 6.908 7.373 7.007 7.272
(1,759) (4,432) (5,763) (7,273)
GDP/100 4.051 4.204 3.735 3.519
(1,886) (4,437) (5,872) (7,291)
Keiretsu 0.843 0.845 0.839 0.839
(8,861) (10,845) (11,299) (12,173)
R&D 0.010 0.015 0.016 0.017
(4,759) (5,951) (7,002) (7,643)
Exports 0.139 0.135 0.126 0.142
(5,782) (6,796) (7,519) (8,449)
Note: the number of companies are in the parenthesis.
30